

TOP SECRET

POINTS OF INTEREST MADE BY GENERAL NORSTAD DURING LUNCH AT LANCASTER HOUSE ON NOVEMBER 1, 1961.

The following were present:

- General Norstad
- Minister of Defence
- Lord Privy Seal
- Chief of Defence Staff
- Sir Robert Scott
- Sir Solly Zuckerman
- Mr. Remabotham

General Norstad described at some length the talks he had recently had in Washington covering a wide range of United States military planning and strategy. He found the new American team impressive. He had begun with three hours in the morning with Mr. McNamara, Mr. Gilpatrick, Mr. Nitze, General Lemnitzer, the Chiefs of Staff and General Taylor, and they continued for most of the afternoon. The others had a briefing meeting with the President the following morning, and this was followed by a two-hour meeting with the President, in which General Norstad had, so to speak, been cross-examined. Mr. McNamara had given a brilliant exposition of all the points at issue, but he had presented the arguments in a manner which made it difficult for General Norstad to challenge them. At the end of the meeting the President had taken him aside and had said that he was in full agreement with General Norstad's views. The trouble was that, on so many occasions, broad decisions taken by the President became distorted in the process of elaboration in the Pentagon in the form of instructions to General Norstad. But the President told him that, if he found things going wrong, he should get into touch with him direct.

2. It was clear from what he said that General Norstad now believed that the United States Administration, or at any rate the President, understood and generally approved of the ideas he had developed on NATO strategy. The so-called "Acheson" plan, which had had the President's blessing shortly after he took office, had caused a lot of unnecessary trouble, but things were now straightening out. General Norstad implied that the "Acheson" idea of making a drastic alteration in the balance of conventional and nuclear weapons in the NATO armoury (which had caused a great deal of trouble with the Germans) was no longer in fashion, though.

3. He referred, in this context, to the Resolution on end-1966 military requirements which the NATO Council had finally passed that very morning, and revealed that he himself had drafted Dr. Stikker's compromise formula whereby consideration of the proposals of the NATO Commanders for M.R.B.M.s would be deferred for the time being, though the subject would be considered by the Council at an early date. The Pentagon had wanted the Council's Resolution to declare that high priority should be devoted to NATO's non-nuclear capabilities. The Germans, on the other hand, had objected to the deferment of consideration of M.R.B.M. requirements. The matter had been referred to President Kennedy who had agreed with General Norstad to drop the American proposal, and the Germans had then withdrawn theirs.

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4. In his view the NAT Council was not the best place to discuss questions of long-term military planning and strategy. It had been a great mistake when Mr. Pinletter last April had given the Council a full statement of the American view on the subject. This statement had been under the influence of the "Acheson" ideas, but in any case it was wrong for a great power with the responsibilities of the United States to put out statements of that kind before they had been properly worked over and assessed by military experts.
5. In a further conversation after lunch with the Lord Privy Seal and Mr. Rensbatham, General Norstad repeated what he had said at his meeting that morning with the Minister of Defence, to the effect that on these matters the United States and the United Kingdom represented opposite poles in NATO, with the other countries at various positions between. He added that he knew that our approach to questions of NATO strategy was largely influenced by our own preoccupations with problems of manpower and finance. This was perfectly understandable, but it was really the wrong way of setting about an objective review of the future military posture of the Alliance. He seemed to agree, however, that his concept of a fundamental divergence between the British and the Americans in this field was not a matter of immediate concern, since not only had the NAT review been deferred but the effort that was being made in connexion with the Berlin build-up was a unifying factor which would help to reconcile any basic differences of view that there might be.
6. During the conversation at lunch General Norstad also raised the question of the directive to the major NATO commanders in the light of the Berlin crisis, which had now been approved by the NATG Council. In his view it had not been necessary to issue such a directive. In any case he did not see how he could possibly have the plans which he was preparing forwarded to the NAT Council for approval by Governments - which was the procedure now laid down in his directive. If he followed this procedure his plans would become known to the Russians, because of certain security weaknesses in the NATO Council of which he was, of course, aware.
7. Nevertheless, he agreed that it was important to secure the cooperation of the NATO countries and to get them to take a realistic and urgent view of the present situation and of the plans for counter-measures which might be needed. He was gravely concerned at the more menacing position which Khrushchev was adopting. The latest threat to Finland was serious. NATO should face up to the possibility of having to take some very awkward decisions before long. In this connexion he suggested, in a subsequent conversation with the Lord Privy Seal and Mr. Rensbatham, that members of the NAT Council in senior military representatives at SHAPE. He thought the Military Committee in permanent session was a pretty useless body. He still favoured the idea of a Commander-in-Chief's Committee.)
8. At no point during these conversations did General Norstad complain about the British contribution to the

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Berlin build-up nor did he refer to Her Majesty's Government's attitude towards contingency planning over Berlin.

9. In reply to a question from the Minister of Defence about a visit by Mr. George Brown M.P. to the American forces in Germany, General Horatad, in a casual aside, mentioned that the new Davy Cruicketts had now been supplied to the United States Forces in Germany, though, at the moment, they were without their warheads.

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MINISTRY OF DEFENCE,
STOREY'S GATE,
OTTAWA

3rd November, 1961

Dear Peter,

The hint dropped by General Horstad about Davy Crocket turns out to be correct. It took about two days probing with members of Mr. John Rubel's party, with whom I am negotiating on interdependence in R. and D. to get this confirmation. John Rubel is an Assistant Secretary for Defense who should know these things but he didn't know this particular one. Apparently, six weeks ago, when General Trudeau was over on this side, he denied that the Americans had any intention to deploy Davy Crocket. Mr. Rubel's party had to telephone to the United States to get the information.

2. It seems that the decision was taken by the Army alone and that they would not have required any authority from the Department of Defense before proceeding. I have asked my friends to confirm that this is so. I find it very hard to believe.

3. The intention is to start issuing Davy Crocket to the American Army in the U.S. before the end of December, by which time they will begin its introduction to Europe.

4. This, as you implied, creates an entirely different situation. Another dimension is added to the dangers of inadequate control - both military and political.

Yours sincerely, 2
(B. Zuckerman)

P.S. I have now had a further message that Mr. McNamara himself authorised the deployment of the weapon.

The Hon. Peter Ramsbotham,
Foreign Office,
S.W.1

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